A short while ago, the tenor of articles about Iraq's president changed. For a long time, articles were all pep-talk and sunshine and positive energy. Now the articles talk about why al-Maliki is the wrong man for the job and a failure. In short-order, al-Malaki has become the Administration's scapegoat for the lack of progress. "Don't blame us; Blame the Iraqis!"
At first I was hesitant to heed these criticisms, partly because I knew the Bush Administration is in desperate need of a fall-guy and partly because I just dont know much about al-Maliki. Who nominated him? Who voted for him? Why is he president to begin with?
This article today is a good biography of al-Malaki in his role as President. Considering how many billions of tax dollars we are spending in Iraq, it is worth reading to learn more about efforts there, which are exceedingly complicated.
After reading this article, I am impressed that al-Maliki would risk his own life to try to be Iraq's first President but I think he may indeed be the wrong man for the job. But one interpretation of why he is the wrong man is that he is too much like Bush/Cheney. He is driven by an ideology and he is too intolerant of others to build bridges and form the coalitions necessary to create a Democracy.
Iraqi Leader's Past of Shiite Activism Undermines Pledge to Heal Rifts
January 2, 2007
Wall Street Journal
Mr. Maliki wanted to leave nothing to chance. His mind raced through several scenarios, however improbable, that might have derailed the execution, says a close adviser who spoke with him. What if the Americans struck a secret deal sparing Mr. Hussein's life in exchange for a halt to attacks against U.S. troops? What if the former dictator's lawyers succeeded in blocking his hanging through U.S. courts? And finally, what if insurgents abducted a group of schoolchildren and threatened to kill them unless the hanging was canceled?
Mr. Maliki hurriedly gathered final signatures for the execution to proceed, dismissing U.S. suggestions that he delay it for 15 days. By the time Mr. Maliki awoke for dawn prayers on Saturday, Mr. Hussein was dead, his disfigured corpse displayed on television with rope marks on the neck.
For the 56-year-old Mr. Maliki, it was a crowning moment in a career defined by uncompromising hatred of everything Mr. Hussein had stood for. Now Mr. Maliki is supposed to rise above the sectarian chasm that has pitted Iraq's Sunni minority against his own Shiite branch of Islam. But as Iraq moves closer to full-scale civil war, a look at Mr. Maliki's history of Shiite activism suggests he is ill-prepared to be a true unifying figure. On his watch, Iraq has become further polarized along sectarian lines, significantly complicating the U.S. efforts to reduce the violence. (See related article.1)
Things here started spinning out of control long before Mr. Maliki took office, and fissures have been hardening among political factions with narrow sectarian interests, sharply limiting Mr. Maliki's room to maneuver. "He's got the world's most difficult job," says Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq.
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Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Mr. Maliki returned to Baghdad and became one of the most enthusiastic enforcers of Washington's sweeping program to purge Iraq's institutions of Baath party members. Many, though not all, were Sunnis. That decision is now widely viewed as a mistake because it antagonized many Sunnis, particularly in the military, and pushed them into the insurgency.
Mr. Maliki's zeal for the program surprised even those who shared his distaste for the Baath party. Mithal al-Alusi, a former Sunni exile who worked under Mr. Maliki on the de-Baathification commission, says he once wanted to clear the names of some 400 low-level Baathists, who were forced to join the party under Saddam to keep their jobs. Facing objections from Mr. Maliki and some others, Mr. Alusi says he leaked the list to an Iraqi newspaper, after which the commission's hand was forced and the names were cleared. "Maliki was very upset about it," recalls Mr. Alusi. "He's allergic to Baathists." Mr. Maliki was concerned that these Baathists hadn't submitted proper applications for clearance, says Sami al-Askari, his friend and adviser.
Mr. Maliki and his close associates believe the Shiites finally assumed the rightful positions of leadership in Iraq, after decades under repressive Sunni rule. "The problem is that our Sunni brothers ruled Iraq for centuries because there was no democracy, no elections," Mr. Maliki said in the interview. "Therefore, they feel that a right has been taken away from them."
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Preserving the new Iraq as a Shia-controlled state is an indispensable ideological consideration for the latest crop of Shiite leaders, who still recall a missed opportunity back in 1920. After an armed uprising against the British colonial rule back then, Shiite sheiks withdrew from politics and paved the way for the ascendancy of the Sunni minority that lasted until 2003.
After 2003, the Sunnis themselves withdrew from politics and allowed the Shiites and Kurds to form a government without them. Security forces took on a Shiite tint, and Sunnis began to complain of sectarian death squads allegedly operating with the complicity of the interior ministry.
From his seat in parliament, Mr. Maliki was lobbying for more Shiite influence in the relatively nonsectarian Iraqi army.
